I would like to thank the Tribunal for allowing me to deal with a personal issue and delaying this Hearing. As you are probably aware, my family and I were evicted from our family home in 1999 which is at the root of my litigation actions.
I have been suffering from various health issues and my wife suffered from breast cancer and recently had an open-heart surgery. Currently, research is being done on the effect of evictions and health issues (please refer to links below A, B & C).
A; https://independentaustralia.net/life/life-display/victims-of-bank-corruption-suffer-emotional-trauma-on-top-of-financial-ruin,11550,
B; https://livinglies.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/the-emergence-of-post-traumatic-foreclosure-disorder/
C; https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-01-enormous-impact-evictions-mental-health.html
Very recently, I have been told that a close member of my family supports and is benefiting from the evil of eviction based on the abuse of Personal Guarantees. I needed some time to try and deal with different health issues quite possibly deriving from all this. I am not sure I have. Or ever will.
In 2011, I co-founded an organisation, now known as diyLAW. Experts have advised me that my legal case has led to many evictions that otherwise may not have happened.
In view of my recent health issues, I become more and more aware of the link between body and mind. diyLAW has been a great advocate for detaching emotions from litigation. I clearly have failed miserably in this instance. I now ask myself if this detachment is possible for other litigants in person. diyLAW will be exploring this question.
This is my submission to the Tribunal in connection with the appeal against the decision of First Tier Tribunal (FTT) dated 20th of September 2016. This hearing is in relation to the meaning of the word “business” in the context of the DPA 1998 s59:
6.1. The FTT on the 20th of September 2016 at point 48 in its decision confirmed “the statute states what the statute states”.
6.2. As confirmed in the cited Friends of Earth v DTI decision and in the judgment of Judge Lloyd-Davies dated 7th of March 2017 the decision whether to release the requested documents appears to be entirely within the ICO`s domain. "...it is clear that the question of the application of the `gateways` is a matter for the discretion of the ICO acting as a public authority" .
6.3. When the ICO exercises its discretion in this matter equity must be considered. Equity requires parties to have “clean hands”. (“He who comes to Equity must come with clean hands”). I attempt to demonstrate in this document at points 6, 7, 8 & 12, 13, 14 to this Tribunal that the FCA does not “come with clean hands”.
6.4, The ICO have twice requested the documents in question to be released to me which the FCA twice denied.
6.5. I submit that a concealment based on perjury must not prevail against Justice. It should not be a public policy to allow regulation to supress criminality.
6.6. The requested documents could potentially be vital in overturning the precedent that had been used to abuse hundreds of thousands of victims. This was confirmed by Kay Linnell MBA, FCA, FEWI a Forensic Accountant. diyLAW is working with the CJC, the MoJ, and among others the FCA itself to establish a platform to help these victims.
6.7. “The statute states what the statute states”. This hearing appears to assume the statute meant to say something else. There is no evidence of that. If the ICO wish to change the statute I submit they need to follow the process (https://bit.ly/2RCVVFH on page 650 paragraph 1&2).
6.8. The statute chose the word business an “etymological chameleon” (as per the cited FoE v DTI case at point 4 on page 8) to give the ICO maximum discretion on disclosure. J Briggs`s judgment is highly relevant. It would be a crime against Equity if the FCA was allowed to continue the concealment by denying the existence on oath of Joel Scott that documents that exist and are the subject of this action.
This hearing is in relation to the meaning of the word “business” in the context of the relevant statute quoted at point 48 of the FTT decision: “the statute states what the statute states”. I am convinced “the statute states what the statute states” for a reason. Accepting the term “business” is an “etymological chameleon” as per the ICO`s reference to FoE v DTI case at point 4 on page 8, one must believe the learned MPs during the readings of the Data Protection Bill in 1998 endorsed the definition of the word “business” to give the ICO discretion in matters like this. It is incumbent on the ICO to use the discretion justly and in accordance with what was in Parliament`s mind. In this instance by refusing to provide the public with the documents being requested, the ICO is apparently concealing an alleged perjury by Stephen Charles Ball (formerly of Lloyds Bank) and that perjury appears to be compounded by the alleged perjury of Joel Christopher Scott of the FCA.
Further to my very recent conversation with Frazer Hunt at the FCA`s Complaints Department, he confirmed the "matter would be better handled by the relevant court or tribunal" on the 12th of December 2018. Added as evidence 30 downloadable at https://bit.ly/2FGYGzs Therefore, I made a request for this Tribunal to make an order for the FCA to release the requested documents. Briggs J heard this matter in relation to CPR 31.17 in 2010 (as suggested at point 67-68 of the FTT decision). I believe the alleged perjured affidavit has not been disclosed by the FCA and I believe that Briggs J`s hearing on 22nd of January 2010 was misled by the FCA into believing there were no more documents. The FSA/FCA apparently ceased their investigation into the Heritage-case in 2008. Clearly, they have additional information about the Perjured Affidavit they are not sharing. They misled Briggs about its existence. At point 10 of evidence no. 26 of Briggs Judgment Briggs J makes the point the FSA confirmed on sworn evidence that “they have provided all the necessary information relating to the memo dated the 14th June 2007 ”. I would suggest the information now being sought from the ICO provided by the FCA surely falls into the definition of "all the necessary information”. At point 13 of the same document, Judge Briggs says “The evidence given by the FSA is sworn evidence by an employee of the FSA which on this application I accept. There is no evidence to allow me to go behind it”. Briggs J concludes his judgment by stating “...I am sorry to disappoint Mr Lampert”. Furthermore, there is some major confusion around Joel Christopher Scott (employee of the then FSA)`s witness statement that is frequently quoted and referred to in Briggs J`s decision, yet the Witness Statement is dated 16 March 2010, which is about two months after the date of Briggs J`s decision. The FCA Complaints Department suggested I took this matter to the Tribunal “Although you have stated that the witness statement provided by the FCA was untrue, your reason for believing this is connected to information that the FCA purportedly held. This matter would be better handled by the relevant court or tribunal”. Email from Frazer Hunt on the 12th of December 2018 as evidence 31 As confirmed in the cited Friends of Earth v DTI decision and in the judgment of Judge Lloyd-Davies dated 7th of March 2017 and by the ICO`s own website, the decision whether to release the requested documents appears to be entirely within the ICO`s domain. "What we do, Our role is to uphold information rights in the public interest." (https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/) "...it is clear that the question of the application of the `gateways` is a matter for the discretion of the ICO acting as a public authority" . It is clear the ICO can release these documents without the FCA`s permission.
Parliament have decided that word “business” is an “etymological chameleon” with the actual definition depending on the context. Regarding the ICO`s submission concerning the meaning of the word "business" as per the Data Protection Bill 1998 section 59 (1) we could argue about the word`s specific meaning in this context forever. However, I suggest the ICO would need to show what was in Parliament’s minds to allow the use of this word to cover up an alleged perjury leading to hundreds of thousands of citizens being evicted from their homes for the benefit of the financial community. I believe the definition of the word “business” has deliberately been made flexible to allow ICO to exercise its discretion. Furthermore, I have been referred to Hansard records by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport as “The information you have requested in available online at the Hansard website: https://hansard.parliament.uk/.” I suggest this may be done by the ICO who have the resources. My argument remains, as I was advised by Prof Nigel Harper former HMRC Banking expert that the following definition would take precedence over all other in Law. The case HMRC at HM Revenue and Customs v Salaried Persons Postal Loans Ltd ChD (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 763 (Ch), Times 20-Apr-06 led to a definition of business activity currently being used by HMRC "business activity means carrying on a trade or profession, or buying and selling goods or services with a view to making a profit or surplus".
It is my strong belief that the precedent set by my case has an enormous role in the current banking/insolvency crisis, especially with references to criminality such as an allegedly perjured Affidavit. I have been advised by a leading solicitor that it should not be public policy to allow regulation to suppress criminality.
With regards to ground 4 in the original submission in front of the First Tier Tribunal in 2016, the public interest has changed and is continuing to change in the direction of transparency and disclosure and openness – which is referred to at point 39 of the cited Cialfi v ICO & Cabinet Office case - especially in the banking insolvency area as shown in Australia (https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/live-banking-and-finance-royal-commission-findings-20180928-p506ke.html) and by the excellent works of the Disclosure Working Group (https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/press-annoucement-disclosure-pilot-approved-by-cprc.pdf). I am convinced proper disclosure of documents may help everyone better understand the abuse of Banking Law. Much of this is due to the efforts of Anthony Stansfeld, Police & Crime Commissioner for Thames Valley.
I am convinced that the FCA is clearly concealing something that is relevant in a case involving an allegedly perjured Affidavit by a bank manager and is tainting the reputation of the ICO and the Courts with that concealment. (The closed part of the FTT hearing was described as "Consideration of the Closed Material, however, while helpful and informative, has not materially influenced the Tribunal`s decision” at point 44 of the First Tier Tribunal decision) An email from Greg Choyce would suggest the FCA were aware of this matter at this highest level. I refer again to point 10 of evidence no. 26 (Briggs Judgment) where the Judge makes the point the FSA confirmed on sworn evidence that “they have provided all the necessary information relating to the memo dated the 14th June 2007”. I would again suggest the information now being sought from the ICO provided by the FCA surely falls into the definition of "all the necessary information”. At point 13 of the same document Judge Briggs says “The evidence given by the FSA is sworn evidence by an employee of the FSA which on this application I accept. There is no evidence to allow me to go behind it.” I now strongly believe there is evidence. I respectfully ask this Tribunal to confirm whether the documents I am seeking would have allowed Briggs J to "go behind" Joel Christopher Scott`s evidence.
The effect of the concealment (of the allegedly perjured Affidavit) by the FCA has been to allow the Court of Appeal (LLOYDS BANK PLC V LAMPERT & ANOR, COURT OF APPEAL - CIVIL DIVISION, NOVEMBER 25, 1998, [1998] EWCA CIV 1840) to stand since 1998. evidence no. 5 on page 45 of the submitted bundle on the 10th of October 2018 This has set the precedent that "on demand” means “on demand” (2 banking hours) and that the secured lender can go straight for the Guarantor without first seeking repayment from the Borrower. As best we can tell, this has resulted in hundreds of thousands of evictions that may not have happened (see Experts` Views on page 9 of the submitted bundle on the 10th of October 2018) without this judgment. It is our intention at diyLAW to continue to work with the legal authorities to establish a process to reverse these flawed decisions. diyLAW will also continue to work with Positive Money, as we believe they are the leading experts on the complicated subject of money creation. diyLAW has been circulating #PGcrimes on social media to identify the extent of this banking crisis and to provide information that may help victims.
The ICO throughout this litigation has failed to deal with the very important public interest point. Police and Crime Commissioner Anthony Stansfeld, who takes the lead for PCCs nationally on major fraud, has been in contact with Richard Bailey at the ICO requesting the release of the document due to relevance to other cases on the 22nd of January 2019. email attached as evidence 32 The Tribunal hopefully will decide the public interest issue which involves PCC Anthony Stansfeld overrides whether or not the FCA may be considered a business for the purposes of section 59 DPA. I do not intend to make any further submission on the public interest issue.
Furthermore, my submission for a Private Criminal Prosecution before DJ Cooper has moved on since the FTT decision in September 2016. I suggest that I am entitled to this information even though we have not appealed it as it was meant to go through a Judicial Review. The closed session at the First Tier Tribunal hearing concealed relevant information and the reasoning behind the JR decision was opaque and I have not been able to comprehend it, and nor has it been explained to me. I have appealed that decision as far as possible within the UK. as per the attached document from the Court of Appeal in C1/2017/1490 as evidence 34 As per comments of Charles Harris QC (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/there-is-no-access-to-justice-if-the-public-cannot-understand-it-przdt50rn), I believe I should be provided with a thorough explanation of the C of A decision (reference number: C1/2017/1490).
Anthony Stansfeld, Police Crime Commissioner of Thames Valley Police, needs to be supported in his investigations into Lloyds Bank in Bristol. I will be supporting PCC Stansfeld as best as I can, and I assume Richard Bailey will do the same.
I respectfully ask this Tribunal to instruct the ICO to release the requested documents to me. I apologise for not having had the opportunity to review the precedent sent by the ICO but believe they are in the main precedents set by the FTT and support release of the documents into the public domain.
